Introduction
Excessive and costly bureaucratic procedures and shrinking economic and social policies have restricted options for Mexican society to function effectively. In order to achieve outcomes demanded by organisations or to fulfil their duties as citizens, Mexicans must operate in the informal polity, outside or against frameworks of regulations. In the context of growing transnational activities the increasing role of unregulated activities is perceived as a large problem, producing loss of control and even criminality that must be eradicated. Mexican people are caught between a battle for economic survival and the burden of a dysfunctional government bureaucracy, the legacy of modernisation and economic rationalism. In that context the use of informal practices is perceived as an easier, or often the only way, to make things happen.
Citizens have to fulfil their rights and responsibilities in the interface between government and the public, in a system characterised by undemocratic practices and abuses of power at all levels. These circumstances have led to an increase of unregulated activities, and boosted the informal sector and the informal polity associated with it. In order to function and fulfil their obligations in such a constrained environment, Mexican citizens and organisations must find alternative strategies.
These pressures create contradictory demands for developing countries such as Mexico.
Corruption in contemporary Mexico exists and can be found at all levels of social, political and economic life. Corrupt governments have accumulated huge fortunes from public resources, and individuals engage in more or less serious acts of corruption in their everyday life (Morris 1991) . But governments have to control the growing informal or underground economy and its associated informal practices, in conditions of underdevelopment and reductions in the already inadequate welfare support, where there is no alternative to offer (Theobald 1990) . For people to cope under these conditions means to find their own ways, through common informal practices.
Informal practices in earlier times were socially acceptable (e.g. local officials in colonial times personally charged for services to complement their low salary (Lomnitz 2000) but these are now perceived as corruption, and government and society are urged to eradicate them. It is important to recognise, also, that eradicating corruption in developing nations does not necessary serve the interests of all players. As has been noted in the literature on corruption and development (e.g. Robinson 1998 ) some practices identified as corruption may be advantageous for global business operations, providing economic activities otherwise not available or serving as the 'grease' that dysfunctional bureaucratic organisations need to deliver. Even if such views are contentious they highlight ambiguities and contradictions underlying anti-corruption initiatives.
My purpose here is modest. I focus on issues associated with informal practices that can be seen as survival strategies but are judged as the culture of corruption. I will draw attention to implications of discursive practices that represent and define corruption, pointing to the ideological constructions that help to mask the problem, blaming practices as causes instead of recognising them as effects of larger historically rooted political and economic interests. I also explore some implications of metaphoric language used in the Mexican public discourse about corruption that connect corruption to cultural values.
In this framework I consider the implicit postcolonial ideology through which countries and their cultures are understood in global exchanges, influencing the way corruption and country attractiveness are measured. To highlight the impact of postcolonial The association of corruption with culture in this phrase implies that Mexican culture (like that of any comparable nation) is characterized by corruption that seems to derive from tradition through our socialization, inherited from our ancestors. It implies we have been 'imprinted' by corruption in the way we behave. It highlights also a core problem for global business. Culture and corruption seem to come together as a problem for global agents, unsure of how to treat potential business partners, and reduce the risk they will spoil 'good' business. Even though there is often a reluctance on the part of theorists to link corruption with culture, some writers from a business perspective make this link overt, as for example, Davis and Ruhe (2003) who correlate the TI corruption index and Hofstede's cultural dimensions in country assessments.
PORTAL, vol. 5, no. 1, January 2008. 5
The phrase 'culture of corruption,' according to Morris (2000: 227, note exert a powerful influence on the way corruption is understood, and anti-corruption efforts are designed (for the impact of metaphoric language see Morgan 1998) .
A common definition of corruption applied by monitoring organisations to measure 'the extent of corruption' is 'the misuse of public power for private benefit' (Lambsdorff 2004: 3) . Such a broad definition is, however, too reductive and misses important distinctions needed to understand the problem and do something about it. When measuring and trying to reduce the 'extent of corruption' it is misleading to ignore distinctions between practices treated as equal under such a general understanding of corruption. 4 Is it the same to fight against 'petty corruption' as 'grand corruption'? Is the same strategy needed to combat bribes in the conduct of public services as to obtain multimillion-dollar contracts? Is it the same to ask for a favour to get a job when you are unemployed as to ignore drug trafficking or white collar fraud? Obviously not. (Spich 1995) . As such it can be considered a discursive regime (Foucault 1971) , in which privileged speakers reinforce through their language the interests of the dominant.
Framed by this hegemonic discourse, international bodies, mostly led by developed nations, represent and measure corruption globally, considering it a risk, another cultural obstacle, for developing countries wishing to integrate into the global economy, inhibiting Multinationals from doing business with them. Corruption is perceived as a 'country risk,' affecting their level of 'attractiveness.' According to the findings of the World Business Environment Survey, country scores in corruption indexes are important considerations for investment decisions (Bartra et al. 2003) , a key factor in the international business environment to differentiate nations in terms of competitive advantage (Porter 2001) . To be competitive in gaining access to foreign investment, a country needs to look attractive in the eyes of potential investors, as attractive as any other 'commodity' offered in the marketplace (Kotler et al. 1993) . Consequently, countries need to eradicate corruption or at least show they are trying.
In this context, the assumption that corruption is part of the culture conveys the sense that countries rated with high risk have a behaviour deeply rooted in their collective consciousness, that everyone shares the values associated with such cultural behaviour, and acts on them in their everyday practices. In this view it is not an anomaly produced by individuals acting against the social order but the effect of the common values of the whole society, passed on across many generations, naturalised as acceptable to all members and highly resistant to change. From the perspective of the people whose Following this influential perspective the culture of the 'other' is assumed to be an obstacle that corporations need to 'tolerate' and deal with to be effective (for business discourses of tolerance as a postcolonial strategy, see Coronado, forthcoming).
To consider corruption as inherent to culture assumes a link between corruption levels in a country and its cultural characteristics. It is important to take culture into account but to do so in such a simplistic way is problematic. Corruption as a complex . But that normative system and its cultural practices are not fixed nor limited to a specific nation, but linked to the broader conditions in which economies and political bodies operate inside each nation and interact in the global context (Bull & Nevel 2003; Elliot 1997) . In this light I will evaluate the link between practices associated with corruption and Hofstede's cultural dimensions.
The Ideological Measurement of Corruption.
The association between cultural dimensions and corruption was not an aim in
Hofstede's work, although the link is made in the business literature, and he explicitly introduced it in recent revisions of his work (Hofstede & Hofstede 2005) . It is easy to correlate cultural dimensions in his terms with practices that are perceived and measured as corruption in the indexes: 'collectivist' cultures can be associated with nepotism and 'individualist' with individual merit; high 'power distance' with abuse of authoritarian power and discretionary power, while low power-distance is claimed to generate fairness. Masculine cultures are associated with machismo, which produces favouritism, discrimination and sexual harassment, whereas feminine cultures promote 
Fighting Corruption the Mexican way
To make Mexico 'attractive' the government is meant to control the levels of corruption that have been measured and publicised through Corruption Index, but Neoliberal pressures confront Mexican governments with a paradox: they need to regulate the informal polity and the corruption associated with its practices, and simultaneously Broad definition of corruption: 'Corruption can range from petty bureaucratic corruption (such as the paying of bribes to low level officials) right through to grand political corruption (such as the paying of large kick-backs in return for the awarding of contracts).' Individual perceptions treated as objective truths.
Attitudes in the workplace toward bosses and colleagues are the nation's behaviour.
Perceptions of 'propensity' to act corruptly as actual corruption.
Culture as homogenous at national level.
Sample behaviour is considered homogenous for whole country and region.
Construction of Country perception index from the results of a few surveys not systematically applied. Imprecise terms in the instruments of measurement.
Individual 'preference' in the form of operating inside an organization. Extent of corruption measured by imprecise terms: 'prevalence,' 'commonness' 'frequency,' 'likelihood,' 'problematic,' 'severity.' Naturalisation of association between characteristics and judgements.
Cultural dimensions of the other negatively valued, the developed positively E.g. Collectivism = corruption vs. Individualism = democracy.
Business sectors as moral authority to judge nation's behaviour: perception from 'senior business people,' 'panel of experts,' 'elite business people,' 'staff to a foreign country,' 'expatriate business men.' Table 1 
: Measurement of culture and corruption in comparison
To deal with this paradox, governmental agencies act inconsistently, sometimes banning some practices, at other times ignoring them. They have also introduced minor changes that reduce the perceived potential of the informal polity to become actual corruption, by regulating a posteriori what is already out of control. One such move was to create designated spaces for illegal street sellers. Another attempt to regulate the unregulated was to reduce the bureaucratic structure involved in delivering services by government agencies, a program called Simplificación administrative (Administrative Simplification). This program attempted to reduce corruption in the interface between the public and the service desk by making some public services free or redirecting payments to the budget office cashier (Tesorería) or into banks. In that way the circulation of money associated with fees (and exposed to bribes) was transferred to public or commercial institutions that have no involvement in the administrative process.
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The impacts of this kind of initiative are difficult to evaluate, but according to peoples' perceptions (from interviews) to submit and pay for an application does not avoid being asked for a 'tip,' which is generally given with the unspoken fear that otherwise the process will be delayed, or the documents 'lost':
in the entrance there is a giant sign that says: No payment for procedures in this office. Everything to be paid in the tesorería. But when we married, when we have already signed, he told us "Well … mmh ... whatever you would like to give for the judge's cooperation …" 
Transparency Mexican's public voice
Transparency Mexican is the 'author' of the document I analyse. Its self-description appears at the bottom of the page by way of a signature:
Non-government organisation which combats corruption in Mexico from an integrated perspective, through public policies and private attitudes which go beyond policy pronouncements to generate concrete changes in the institutional framework and the culture of legality.
6
In order to communicate to the public through the media this organisation released a synthesis of the last results of the application of the Índice Nacional de Corrupción y Buen Gobierno (National Index of Corruption and Good Governance in Mexico). Table   2 includes some elements from the document that highlight the ideological construction of corruption in this text. One press release from Transparencia Mexicana is too little to prove much. However, when analysed closely it throws up relevant meanings for my argument. First, the title produces a shock in the audience (myself, in the first instance). Through its links with Transparency International the speaker, TM, establishes its expert status to evaluate corruption in Mexico. From that position it declares that Mexico is 'stuck in' levels of corruption, which suggests that everything done so far has failed. The reader learns later Even though the information provided in the document paints a more complex picture, the simplistic title conveys a sense of failure that implies the difficulties of changing a culture of corruption into a culture of legality, the aim of this organisation as presented at the end of the press release. In this reading, the text creates a sense that small outcomes are insufficient to fulfil the grand aim of this organisation: to transform
My translation Quotes in Spanish
Mexico's culture of corruption into a 'culture of legality.'
From other sources we find that the comparison is inexact, since the data does not come from a longitudinal study but from different samples. It is unclear if the differences cited showed that the various groups are more honest in reporting bribes, or if the actual corruption in the delivery of services has changed. Detailed information about the instrument is available in the organisation web page (http://www.tm.org.mx) but to the public, the press release and article arouse the maximum concern.
The grammatical subjects of the different sentences in the text produce confusion. It is difficult to know who the agent of corruption is, and who is trying to improve. Mexico is a problematic subject of the sentence in the title. Under a global economy the promise that individual success and higher consumer capacity will bring economic development, higher employment and social prosperity is only fulfilled for the few who, according to the dominant discourse, are developed, have the right cultural qualities and therefore inhabit a culture of legality. For the rest, Neoliberalism and Postcolonialism not only fail to transform the economic, social and political conditions in which corruption is played out, but through this failure help reproduce the institutionalised corruption that produces winners and losers in both developed and developing worlds. ripples. This image implies that this small contribution from business, the billboard, will expand and produce the change needed to satisfy their desire. The question is how this phrase used by common workers plays a part in the campaign, as against the business leaders' 'thirst for honesty'? The two phrases polarise two sectors. Business are thirsty for honesty and do not use that language (implying they are not corrupt) while common people are literally thirsty and cannot buy a soft drink but are to blame for corruption, like the 'homes' the TM press release identified as having inclinations to be corrupt.
Below the image the statement 'NO A LA CORRUPCIÓN' (Say no to corruption)
indicates that the main voice in the text is that of people united in honesty to reject 7 As in an example reported by del Castillo and Guerrero: 'si quieres con el refresco nos arreglamos' (if you want with a soft drink we can fix it) (2003: 21).
corruption. But if corruption in this view is interpreted as demanding a tip, what actions
would oppose it? To impose a new rule that low-paid employees are not allowed to ask for a tip? Or maybe, if we believe in the good will of businesses (at least those united against corruption) they will increase wages so that workers do not need to ask pa'l chesco? A sceptic will suspect that they will just continue with their campaign as 'ethically responsible businesses,' saving some taxes for this contribution to society, building a positive image, and maybe, still profiting from institutionalised corruption.
Concluding Remarks
Through analysing these two examples I draw attention to the weight given in anticorruption initiatives to practices from the informal polity, mostly associated with poorer sectors of society. These practices are not so much a culture of corruption as basic to survival. From this we can see that to represent corruption as inherent in a culture targets informal practices used by common people to survive, instead of focusing on the contexts of institutionalised corruption, which involve national and global agents pressuring developing countries to become cheap open markets, with the reduced welfare required by Neoliberal models as conditions for aid or loans.
The so-called culture of corruption has attributed the 'problem' to culturally learned behaviours of common people, who supposedly act in that way in any context, whether as citizens or on behalf of private or public organisations. Corruption in this view is linked to the country's 'cultural dimensions,' which according to the postcolonial managerial discourse prevent the country from perform efficiently in the global economy. According to this ideology, stopping corruption means changing the behaviour of common people, 'the family homes that are inclined to corruption.'
The analysis of anti-corruption initiatives shows their focus on behaviour at lower levels of bureaucracy and in the 'homes' that interact with them, not exposing systemic practices that owe much to global pressures in the contemporary Neoliberal dispensation. Ordinary Mexicans have internalised discourses that characterise their practices as a 'culture of corruption.' But these practices, irrespective of whether they are called culture, folklore, cancer, creativity, flexibility or corruption, seem their only way to deal with a state bureaucracy economically and politically complicit with the interests of the Neoliberal global economy.
